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The Equitable Theory of Injunction
in Domestic Relations
by Moses H. Thompson*
A DEQUATE protection in the nature of injunctive relief has been
extended to all branches of the law where there is a primary
property right to be protected. Despite the rapid development in
the field of equitable relief it has always been considered ex-
traneous to actions in domestic relations. The majority of the
courts will not protect marital and domestic rights from third
party intervention because such action involves a personal right
rather than a necessary property right.' There is adequate reason
for a change in this precept which delegates personality to such
an insecure position. Only a limited number of the courts in
United States have recognized the need for the extension of pro-
tection to purely personal rights.
I. Majority View.
In most American jurisdictions the courts have been reluctant
to extend the principle of equitable injunction to domestic rela-
tions where the problem involves personal rights as distinct from
property rights. Snedaker v. King,2 an Ohio case, is cited more
than any other case in American jurisprudence supporting the
argument against the use of the injunction in marital strife
not involving property rights. The court, in its refusal to ex-
tend the equitable principle, relies primarily upon the im-
practicality of enforcing such an injunction. Plaintiff, Mrs. King,
attempted to enjoin permanently the defendant, Jesse Snedaker,
from going near, visiting or associating with her husband. The
trial court granted the relief requested. The Supreme Court of
Ohio held that this was an extreme instance of government by in-
junction attempting to govern, control, and direct personal rela-
tions and domestic affairs. It said that the party in this action has
* MOSES H. THOMPsON is a graduate of Sandusky High School and attended
West Virginia State College from 1940 to 1943. Thereafter he enlisted in
the army and served in the European Theater of Operations with the United
States Army Signal Corps. He is married and the father of two children.
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818). The general no-
tion of the necessity of a property right is said to have arisen in this case.111 Ohio St. 225, 145 N. E. 15 (1924).
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an adequate remedy at law and the extension of the jurisdiction of
equity was not warranted either in the interest of good morals
or public policy.
Snedaker v. King is noteworthy because of the strong dis-
senting opinion. The theory expressed in the dissent is that the
remedy at law is not adequate, and the marriage relation is a con-
tract entitled to protection against unlawful interference although
the obligations of that contract create only personal rights. Jus-
tice Marshall in his opinion says, "All property rights and in-
terests, even though growing out of the marital relation, are en-
titled to care and consideration in our courts as much as those
other interests growing out of commercialism." 3 This dissent is
a realistic approach to a problem that has plagued the courts and
is an offspring of English jurisprudence. 4
Typical of the reluctance mentioned are the holdings of the
courts of New York. They hold that injunction cannot be granted
merely to restrain injury to feelings, and this interpretation is
presented in the now famous Baumann case. 5 Plaintiff Mrs.
Charles Ludwig Baumann sought not only the declaration of her
marital status but also attempted to enjoin the defendants, Mr.
Charles Ludwig Baumann and his paramour, from holding out or
representing that they were husband and wife, and also to prevent
Mr. Baumann from representing that he was divorced from the
plaintiff. Charles Ludwig Baumann, married and domiciled in
New York, went to Yucatan, Mexico, in 1924, and there obtained
from an administrative officer, known as the director general
of civil register, a certificate of divorce. This divorce was declared
void upon jurisdictional grounds and thus Mr. Baumann's sub-
sequent marriage was void. The lower court granted the declara-
tory judgment and also thought it justifiable to grant the in-
junctive relief for which the plaintiff petitioned. The appellate
court contended that the lower court had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, arguing that, "It is elementary that a court of equity will
not award the extraordinary relief of injunction, except in cases
where some legal wrong has been done or threatened, and where
there exists in the moving party some substantial legal right to be
'Id. at 243, 145 N. E. at 21; see 14 A. L. R. 300.
'Contra: Bank v. Bank, 180 Md. 254, 23 A. 2d 700 (1942), (Right of con-
sortium is not recognized as a subject of equity protection); see, e.g., Chap-
pell v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896); Hodecker v. Stricker, 39
N. Y. 515 (1896).
'Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1919). But cf. Dandine
v. Dandine, 195 P. 2d 171 (1948).
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protected. Whether there exists or is threatened a legal wrong
to be restrained and a legal right to be protected is, in the ab-
sence of disputed question of fact, a question of law." 6 The court
reasoned that if the defendants, by holding themselves out as
husband and wife under the name of "Baumann" did commit a
legal wrong which infringed upon a substantial legal right of the
plaintiff the court had the jurisdiction to grant the injunction.
But in this case, the court felt it does not constitute such a legal
wrong because the matrimonial status of the plaintiff was estab-
lished by the declaratory judgment which did protect the plain-
tiff's property rights. The court admitted that the conduct of the
defendant was censurable, illegal and socially and morally
wrong; it also admitted that such conduct was humiliating to the
plaintiff. Yet on the theory that the primary duty of a court with
equitable powers was to protect property rights alone and that
personal rights were merely incidental, the court circumvented a
paramount issue by its refusal to grant injunctive relief.
How a court can concede the commission of these wrongs and
still maintain a philosophical indifference is difficult to under-
stand. It should be noted that the plaintiff was not seeking pro-
tection for any interest she may have in realty or personalty.
She has a status as a wife with certain legal and social incidents.
It is this status and these incidents that she seeks to protect and
since a monetary equivalent is impossible to ascertain, she should
have her remedy in equity. Unfortunately, this same attitude
shown by the court in the Baumann case was taken in Spitzer v.
Spitzer,7 presenting essentially the same fact situation.
Dissenting opinions in the majority of cases, wherein injury
to a property right is prerequisite to the maintenance of a success-
ful suit, have developed arguments on a humanitarian basis. For-
ward thinking legal minds denounce a failure to protect personal
rights as rigorously as property rights. Justice Crane, dissenting
in Baumann v. Baumann, states, "We are all agreed that Mr.
Baumann has but one wife, and that is the plaintiff. Her name
is Mrs. Charles Ludwig Baumann-there is no other such per-
son living. She is known throughout New York in the circle in
which she lives by this name. It is more than a name-it is a
position, a status, a condition, a relationship, a capacity. A name
may mean very little, but the status and relationship which it
-Id. at 386, 165 N. E. 820-821.
'77 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (1947).
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indicates may mean a great deal, not only to the parties but to
the world. It means so much that a very large number of our
citizens are opposed to the severance of the marriage ties for any
reason." s He completely agrees that courts should not try to
enforce morality by using an injunction but that this person has
a right to have her status in the community protected, as a mother
and a wife. Judge O'Brien who joined in the dissent, said, "Some-
thing unsound appears to lie in a rule which would deny a court
of equity the power to enjoin the masquerade of another's name
and title and the infringement of mingled personal and property
rights which include that name and constitute the matrimonial
status." He further contends, "An individual possesses an ex-
clusive property right in a name." 9 Thus this indicates that
courts can extend the principles of injunction without emasculat-
ing the fundamental concepts of the doctrine. If there is a prop-
erty right in a name, here is at least a basis for extension of the
doctrine.
U. Minority View.
The solid line evidenced by the majority of the courts typified
in the above cases has not remained unbreached. In Hall v.
Smith10 the doctrine was extended to a limited degree. The
action was for alienation of affection. In the action the plaintiff
moved for a temporary injunction against a woman whom she
charged with having enticed away the love and affection of her
husband. The plaintiff was deprived of the society of her husband
by the conduct of the defendant. The court held that it could en-
join the defending party, pendente lite, from the continuance of
those acts which lie at the foundation of the cause of action.
Justice Benedict reported, "Rules of general application in cases
of injunctions of a temporary character are applicable in this
case. The plaintiff must show not only the existence of a legal
right, but must affirmatively show that acts sought to be re-
strained will be a violation of it. Injunctions do not issue to
prevent acts because they are immoral or illegal or criminal but
only in case the plaintiff's civil rights are being invaded."
The Supreme Court of Washington, following a modern trend,
concluded, "We recognize and approve the modern tendency to
'See note 5 supra at 390, 165 N. E. 822.
'See note 5 supra at 392-393, 165 N. E. at 823.
"140 N. Y. S. 796, 798 (1913), (Motion was denied because the supporting
action was barred by the statute of limitations.).
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protect personal rights by injunctive relief where there is no
adequate remedy at law." 11 Although this statement was merely
dictum, the case being dismissed upon another issue, it does show
progressive thinking; it is an indication of what the court would
do if presented with the same facts in another action. California
courts adopt the same approach as the Washington court although
in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club12 primarily a personal right
is involved which is not connected with a problem in domestic
relations. It does, at lease, ignore the necessity for a property
right upon which the courts are so emphatically insisting, and
places a personal right in as enviable a position. The plaintiff
in the Orloff case was ousted from the defendant turf club on
two occasions without cause. He was of good moral character
and conducted himself properly at all times. The plaintiff, by
this action, was humiliated and embarrassed. Damages were al-
lowed by statute but these were quite speculative and the plain-
tiff sought an injunctive measure of relief. Justice Carter in his
opinion proclaims, "On principle it is difficult to find any sound
reason for the enunciation of a broad principle that equity will not
protect personal rights. There may be situations in which equity
will not act. Such situations arise where the legal remedy is
adequate or may involve a prior restraint on freedom of speech
or press, or where there is no established legal right to be pro-
tected or some other recognized ground for refusing an equitable
remedy is presented. The issue should not in logic turn upon the
sole proposition that a personal right rather than a property right
is involved. To so reason is to place property rights in a more
favorable position than personal rights, a doctrine wholly at odds
with the fundamental principle of democracy." 13
Massachusetts also seems to have relaxed from the position to
which it had clung so tenaciously. This inference can be drawn
from Kenyon v. City of Chicopee14 wherein Justice Qua wrote,
"We are impressed by the plaintiffs' suggestion that if equity
would safeguard their right to sell bananas it ought to be at least
equally solicitous of their personal liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution upon the same condition which it will protect prop-
erty rights by injunction. In general these conditions are that
"Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wash. 2d 918, 226 P. 2d 895 (1951).
230 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P. 2d 321 (1947).
Id. at 117, 180 P. 2d at 325. Emphasis supplied.
14320 Mass. 528, 533-534, 70 N. E. 2d 241, 244 (1946); see Berrien v. Pollitzer,
165 F. 2d 21 (1947).
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unless relief is granted a substantial right of the plaintiff will be
impaired to a material degree-that the remedy of law is inade-
quate-and that injunctive relief can be applied with practical
success and without imposing an impossible burden on the court
in bringing process in disrepute." So, by injunction, the court
protected the plaintiff's rights to distribute literature on the
streets of the City of Chicopee as employees of the Jehovah Wit-
nesses. The officials of the city were enjoined from interfering
with the plaintiff's Constitutional rights, to carry on business in
general and the right to obtain work in their chosen field.
The problem of adequacy of remedy at law and injunctive
relief in domestic relations can be handled with a social con-
sciousness and in a humanitarian spirit. There is need for a view
directly opposed to that which is regarded as the law in the
majority of the jurisdictions. Georgia stands out as a proponent
in the case of Stark v. Hamilton.15 Here a man debauched a minor
girl and induced her to abandon her parental abode and live with
him in a state of fornication. Will equity afford a remedy by in-
junction in a suit by the father to enjoin the man from associat-
ing and communicating with the girl? The opinion responds with
profound reasoning; the court says, "It in a sense involves both
personal and property rights. The father has a right, under the
statutes of this state, to protect his minor child, to be protected
by her and to have her reside in his home and with his family." 16
The court believes that money damages would be adequate in
some circumstances, especially in regard to humiliation, but
that damage to a family reputation is irreparable; some things
money cannot repair. There is a prevailing tendency among in-
dividuals to put too many things on a pecuniary basis; but for the
courts to adopt such a concept would indeed be an indication of
moral decay.
A decision often cited is the case of Henley v. Rockett,17
wherein it is said that injunctive relief is not limited to the pro-
tection of property rights, but extends into many fields where no
adequate remedy at law is available. It must be noted that in
Alabama no action can be maintained for alienation of affection
or criminal conversation. In this case the wife did not lose the
support of her husband but just his companionship. Judge
149 Ga. 229, 99 S. E. 861 (1919).
"Id. at 230, 99 S. E. at 862.
17243 Ala. 172, 8 So. 2d 852 (1942).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/7
INJUNCTION IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Bouldin stated, "But support is only one element of consortium
properly construed-the temporary injunction forbids those acts
on the part of the respondent tending to cultivate and keep up
the wrongful relationship between her and complainant's hus-
band, as featured in this particular case." Is
A case which may well make legal history was that of Pashko
v. Haas et al.,19 an Ohio case. In this case an action for alimony
was initiated in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County.
The plaintiff, Orpha Jean Pashko, asked that during the pendency
of the suit her husband and the new defendant, Florence Haas,
be restrained from communicating or associating with each other.
Judge Julius Kovachy held that the injunction should be granted
since both of the defendants admitted the allegations of the peti-
tion. This case must be considered in direct opposition to the
stand taken by the Ohio Supreme Court in Snedaker v. King,20
up to now the ruling case in Ohio. Although many of the facts
are similar, the distinguishing factor is that Snedaker case was
an original action in a court of equity while the action for a re-
straining order by Mrs. Pashko was supported by a suit for ali-
mony in a court having equitable powers. Judge Kovachy
valiantly defends the marital status and its obligations. He writes,
"Marriage is a civil contract between husband and wife consid-
ered by law a status in which the state has an interest and over
which it should exercise watchful vigilance to safeguard its
sanctity and to prevent its disruption, if possible." 21 The opinion
discusses the philosophy pertaining to alimony and divorce drawn
from numerous jurisdictions. The jurist places the value of per-
sonal rights on as substantial a foundation as property rights.22
Perhaps a possible solution is pointed out in some American
jurisdictions wherein the courts will protect a personal right by
injunction if there is a co-existent nominal property right. The
Id. at 176, 8 So. 2d at 855.
45 Ohio Op. 489, 101 N. E. 2d 804 (1951).
"See note 2 supra.
See note 19 supra at 489, 101 N. E. 2d at 804.
Judge Julius Kovachy emphasized, during a discussion of this case, that
a court must not overlook the appropriate procedure that follows when a
petitioner seeks a restraining order against the person. When a petitioner
seeks to restrain a party from relieving himself of assets during the
pendency of an action in domestic relations a hearing is not needed; the
order is automatically granted upon motion. An oral hearing is necessary,
however, before an injunction may be considered against the person. This
is mandatory. It gives the defendant an opportunity to defend himself
against any false accusations and gives all parties in the action their day
in court.
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classic case using this approach was decided in New Jersey.23
The plaintiff sought the cancellation of a birth certificate placed
on a public record. He was charged with paternity of a child
and sought a permanent injunction against the mother and the
child claiming under the certificate the status and name and
privileges of property born of a legal marriage. Judge Dille in
his opinion says, "If it appeared in this case that only the com-
plainant's status and personal rights were thus threatened or
thus invaded by the action of the defendant and the filing of the
false certificate, we should hold, and without hesitation, that an
individual has rights, other than property rights, which he can
enforce in a court of equity and which a court of equity will en-
force against invasion and should declare that the complainant
was entitled to relief." Although it was part of the opinion it was
not the official voice of the supreme tribunal, but merely dictum;
for he further states, "-whether this might not have rested on
such personal basis alone without reference to the technical pro-
tection of property is not decided, because the present case does
present the property feature to an extent sufficient to satisfy
the rule adopted by the court below." 24 This represents a com-
mendable subterfuge resorted to by a court to do that which the
public calls for. If justice need be accomplished in this manner
the rule to which the majority of courts adhere must deter justice
in equally as many cases as it abets it.
In a jurisdiction where the courts are confronted with the
problem of finding a substantial property right and are reluctant
to establish precedent why should not the court employ a legal
fiction? Certainly there is nowhere in law a better situation in
which the end will justify the means. For example, in Ohio a
man or woman has a right of action in tort for loss of consortium
due to the malicious acts of third persons. Malice in this instance
is inferred from the intent to do harm or interfere with the marital
rights of another. It would not be irrational to say that if this
interference with a marriage relationship constitutes a cause of
action for damages, a continued interference should be worthy of
protection by injunction. A good example of this is the case of
Flandermeyer v. Cooper.25 The court held that a wife could main-
"Mitchell v. Vanderbilt, 72 N. J. Eq. 910, 67 Atl. 97 (1907); Chaffee, 34 Harv.
L. Rev. 407 (1920-21). But cf. Reed v. Carter, 268 Ky. 1, 103 S. W. 2d 663(1937), (A natural right supported by a contract executed for a considera-
tion).
"Mitchell v. Vanderbilt, supra note 23 at 919, 926, 67 Atl. at 100, 102.
85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102 (1912).
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tain an action against a man who supplied her husband with
morphine which rendered him mentally and physically incom-
petent. The first paragraph of the syllabus reads, "Husband and
wife are entitled to the affections, society, cooperation and aid to
each other in every conjugal relation and either may maintain an
action for damages against anyone who wrongfully and malici-
ously interferes with the marital relation and thereby deprives
one of the society, affection and consortium of the other." It is
difficult to find a situation any more meritorious than this in
which a court with equitable powers should grant an injunction
if such were requested by the injured party.
Ohio courts can dissolve a marriage where one of the elements
of consortium are flagrantly violated by one of the spouses. 26 If
one of the injured parties petitioned the court for a restraining
order to prevent the deprivation of one of these rights by the in-
tervention of a third party the court will deny the relief re-
quested. The void caused by the lack of a technical property
interest destroys all hope of reconciliation of an estranged couple,
or the preservation of a family. Courts which deny a writ of in-
junction to prevent this unrighteous conduct, in a proper case,
are closing their eyes to the actual needs.
Adequacy of remedy can be nebulous in scope. Courts in
many instances, even when they feel that injunctive relief is
reasonable, evade the issue by declaring that the petitioning party
has other remedies. It is cruel rule to apply in cases wherein hu-
man emotions and strained feelings are involved. Many of the
courts exhibit an apathetic attitude when declaring that the
plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law that would assure a com-
plaining party the relief he seeks.27 An example of how harsh the
application can be has been found in Hadley v. Hadley28 where
a divorce was considered an adequate remedy when one party
sought injunctive relief. The plaintiff, Dorothy Hadley, brought
an action for divorce from Charles Hadley on the grounds of non-
support and cruelty. Charles Hadley, the defendant, filed a cross-
bill of complaint for an injunction to restrain the plaintiff from
associating with certain people. The lower court dismissed the
cross-bill of the defendant and granted the decree of divorce.
On appeal the decree for plaintiff was reversed on the contention
White v. Buchwalter, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 589, 75 N. E. 2d 604 (1947).
See 28 Am. Jur. 39 (What constitutes adequate remedy).
323 Mich. 555, 36 N. W. 2d 144 (1949).
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that the evidence produced on behalf of the plaintiff did not
warrant a decree of divorce. Yet the higher court sustained the
trial court's action in dismissing the cross-bill of the defendant
which sought an injunction. The court said that if the defendant
felt so aggrieved his relief should be confined to a dissolution of
the marital relation.
Concededly this would be a remedy, but it should be the last
alternative. When one is making a concerted effort to mend a
marital breach through the aid of a court would it be justice to
say that this court cannot give you aid because you have other
remedies, one being the dissolution of your marriage or a fi-
nancial satisfaction? Although this is one way of handling a
matter in which every citizen has an interest, it certainly is not
the most satisfactory. An adequate remedy at law, preventing
relief by injunction should be as plain, complete, practical and
efficient to the ends of justice in its prompt administration as the
remedy of injunction itself.29
I. Statutory Provisions.
Although the majority of American courts still retain the old
rule concerning injunction which infiltrated into our system
from England, the English courts have modified their position.
In the early days the power of the chancery courts of England
was hampered by the necessity of finding a prerequisite property
right. Today this is not the rule, for the limitations were removed
by an act of Parliament in 1783 that gave power to grant in-
junction in all cases "in which shall appear to the court to be
just or convenient that such order be made." 30 Since such time
courts with equitable powers are no longer required to search
for property rights on which to base their jurisdiction to grant an
injunction.9 1
A few states in this country have statutes which resemble
this English provision. The Texas legislative body granted the
right to the courts to issue an injunction regardless of the lack of
property interest in the action. 2 Oklahoma also has such a
statute which authorizes injunctive relief to prevent injury
"Cook v. Panhandle Refining Co., 265 S. W. 1070 (1924).
" English Judicature Act of 1783, Sec. 25 (8); see 37 L. R. A. 787 (1897).
'See 14 R. C. L. 371.
n TEx. Rav. ST. 1925, Art. 4643, (Discussion of this statute in Hawks v.
Yancey, infra note 37 at 237-238).
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol1/iss1/7
INJUNCTION IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
to personal rights without requiring that there be a threat-
ened damage to a property right in order to obtain injunctive
relief.33
Texas cases illustrate what courts can do when not hindered
by a rule requiring that a property right be the subject matter of
the action. The excellent opinions of the justices in these cases
are indicative that such decisions could be possible without such
an enabling statute. In Ex Parte Warfield 34 the right of injunc-
tion was recognized in an action denying habeas corpus to one
who was imprisoned in jail on a contempt charge for violating an
order restraining the defendant from writing to, speaking to, or
talking with the plaintiff's wife, whose affection he had already
partially alienated. Again in Witte v. Bauderer" the court en-
joined the defendant from having anything to do with the plain-
tiff's wife except that the defendant be permitted to associate
and consult with the plaintiff's wife in such manner that she can
discharge her duties as bookkeeper for the defendant. Justice
Smith relates, "We know of no law of God or man under which
appellant may claim the right to intimately consort, day and
night, with appellee's wife, in open and boasting defiance of the
express wish and command of the appellee nor does the restrain-
ing order deprive the appellant of a single right to which he is
entitled under the law. The contention that the appellant has
the right to continue these objectionable relations with appel-
lee's wife, and to flaunt those relations in the face of the appellee,
and the latter's family and friends, and the public, is an affront
to decency and propriety, and can get no approval in this
court." 36 This right of injunctive relief was likewise granted in
Hawks v. Yancey,3 7 the court holding that a writ of injunction
would issue to protect a woman from a person with whom she
had had illicit relations, which person insisted upon imposing
himself upon her on the public street, watching over her and pre-
venting her from enjoining "her constitutional rights." Even
in light of statutory provisions, these cases are indicia of a for-
ward step in establishing the fact there is a need for the protec-
tion of personal rights from third party intervention.
"12 OKLA. STAT. 1951, Sec. 1382.
"40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 413, 50 S. W. 933 (1899); see 1 L. R. A. (ns) 1149.
"255 S. W. 1016 (1928).
"Id. at 1017.
"265 S. W. 233 (1924).
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IV. Summary.
Which is the best reasoning? Time seems to be the only ele-
ment that will decide. The courts seem reluctant to set a prece-
dent, dogmatically refusing to breach the restrictions by any posi-
tive action except in isolated instances. It stands to reason that
many homes can be saved and more often stabilized by a change
from the majority rule. Home life is a fundamental necessity in
a democratic existence. One of our prominent justices says, "The
necessity for the continuous adoption of the law to the needs of
the time is a fundamental problem deserving of extensive con-
sideration." 38 He confides that the common law lags behind so-
cial change and when the gap between common law and actual
needs becomes too great, legislative enactments are necessary.
Even legislation is not always adequate because the perspective
of a legislature is not always as consistent as the reasoning of a
tribunal which has all the facts of a particular case or cases at its
disposal to decide without extrinsic influences. It is the duty of
the courts to keep pace with the social trends in American life.
Justice Holmes states convincingly, "It is revolting to have not
better reason for a rule of law than it was laid down in the reign
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds which are
laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past." 39 Laws are only as good as they
are effective in actually being put to work and actively applied to
serve justice. "How well law succeeds in its task is the measure
of its success. If the purposes which law exists to achieve are
effectuated, well and good. If not, law must be molded and shaped
to attain these ends." 40
We cannot consider this as a hopeless situation because the
courts are gradually adjusting to the needs of the day. The
evolution of law is a slow process; courts do not readily accept
these ideas although they are conscious that changes are needed.
Pound in his "Interests of Personality" 41 states that this nation
is backward in preventive measures in law. "In connection with
interests in personality, where redress by way of damages is
often obviously inadequate if not applicable, the hesitation of our
'A. T. Vanderbilt, Modernization of the Law, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 433 (1951).
"Holmes, Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
" T. A. Cowan, The Relation of the Law to Experimental Social Science,
96 U. of PA. L. REv., 484, 501 (1926).
"28 HARv. L. REv. 343, 364 (1915).
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law to apply preventive measures is unfortunate and without
excuse."
Major conflicts which lead to separations and divorce in family
life in the United States, once a rarity in American life, have
created a serious problem which tends to destroy the foundation
of the American home. Even divorce, which was once looked
upon as scandalous and a disgrace, today is a common everyday
occurrence. Today's courts have been unable to keep pace and
there is a tremendous backlog of domestic relations cases. Our
courts cannot possibly solve this problem unaided because it is a
condition that involves society, social changes, shifts in popula-
tion, war hysteria, and many other factors, each contributing to
a depressing condition. The courts have evidenced feelings of
sympathy but they have not used to full advantage the devices at
their disposal. When a court fails to administer justice people
blame the courts and not a rule of law even though a particular
segment of the law is being strictly construed. Courts rightfully
can be blamed when nothing interferes with justice but prece-
dence and out-moded theories. Courts are an entity established
not by mere accident but by democratic design to give balance
to a way of life and protect people from a transgression upon any
of their aggregate rights. Thus Americans expect and deserve a
reasoning that will cope with the problems that confront them in
everyday life. Where laws are inadequate to protect the person
and all his aggregate rights it is the duty of the court to fill the
void caused by the lack of statutory protection for personal
rights and grant injunctive relief.
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